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For verily I say unto you, Till heaven and earth pass,
one jot or one tittle shall in no wise pass from the law, till all be fulfilled.
1. Normative 'I' in fundamental religious norms (instead of Introduction)
I would like to commence with a Lesson of History.
In the fourth century, there emerged maybe the most serious controversy about one letter in history. The
Fathers of the Council of Nicaea (325) have used the word homoousios in order to express the relation of
the Father's nature to the Son's. Based on its etymology, the compound Greek word means 'of the same
essence', or as used more philosophically, 'of the same or similar substance' (Bridge 1910). I emphasise:
same, OR similar. In the Catholic Encyclopaedia, it is explained that because 'the unity of the Divine nature
wasn't questioned, the word carried the fuller meaning: "of one and the same substance'" (ibid). Thus, the
conditions outside the ambiguous sign - in fact, people's faith and lack of doubt - directed the believers to
pick the orthodox meaning. The meaning which, moreover, corresponded to the simpler, more concrete and
unsophisticated meaning.
For an excursive example, let us take the word 'dog'. In common sense it is used to mean canis lupus 
familiaris. Nevertheless, there are other uses. I do not refer to the content of Wikipedia article 'Dog
(disambiguation)', listing several animals, people, music, and other, but to the popular use of the word as a 
pejorative, e.g. for 'something worthless or of extremely poor quality' ('dog'). In consequence, 'dog' means
(at least) 'canis lupus familiaris OR something worthless' (even if there are expensive breeds). Only the
context, outer conditions fix which of the meanings should be chosen. If somebody hears that he is like
a dog, it may mean that he is on all fours, or devoted like one, or that he is perceived as worthless (if
somebody hears that he or she is a bitch, it may mean even more). Due to common sense, body language
and rather simplistic double entendre, the right meaning is easy to be found in every situation.
Now from dog back to God. Even if God is considered to be simple, statements concerning the latter are
rarely so simplistic; nor is it usually possible to recourse to body language while interpreting a text taken
as revelation. There is a temptation to use common sense exaggeratedly, developing it to a philosophy -
making common sense questionable for the sake of common sense. In our history, this is what was done
by the group usually referred to as Arians. These Syrian rationalists could not take as granted, that the
substances of Father and Son are identical; there had to be time when Son was not there. Some might say
they did not believe unconditionally in the Divine unity. An open trouble came to light. For Christianity
had become an allowed religion, the controversy was public. In the beginning, the Apostle-like Constantine
treated it
'as an idle dispute about words and enlarged on the blessings of peace. The emperor, we should
call to mind, was only a catechumen, imperfectly acquainted with Greek, much more incompetent
in theology, and yet ambitious to exercise over the Catholic Church a dominion resembling that
which, as Pontifex Maximus, he wielded over the pagan worship. From this Byzantine conception
55
Tanel Kalmet 
(labelled in modern terms Erastianism) we must derive the calamities which during many hundreds
of years set their mark on the development of Christian dogma.' (Barry 1907.)
Rather sooner than later the Council convened in Nicaea, where the majority denounced Arian proposal
for a Creed, pronouncing it with the word homoousios - probably with the common sense and orthodox
meaning 'consubstantial'. As rebels, the most dogged of the Arians were banished. Although the Emperor
changed his mind and was finally baptised by one of them, a religious peace was not achieved, and the 'idle
dispute about words' went on.
The moderate party who tended to interpret the word homoousios rationally as 'of similar substance',
and in order to preclude the disambiguation, adopted the Creed with homoiousios instead. Did you notice
the difference? An 'i\ The meaning of which makes the word unambiguously mean 'of similar substance'
- and thus not 'consubstantial' (ibid.). The decades of theological havoc that followed show that a single
jot - iota hen , the smallest letter - may have importance. Vice versa, if the jot is lost, the change may be
tremendous.
Much of the importance the jot has, is ascribed or adscripted, not free. The impact a jot has does not
depend on the jot itself, but on the context and our perception. If we consider the jot as a taboo, holy,
normative or significant, it has meaning. If not, an *i* makes no difference. For somebody who does not
know the stoiy of'i', it is just a mumble.
Colloquial Estonian verb patrama may be translated as 'to chatter', or 'to talk rapidly in a foolish or
purposeless way' ('chatter'); the same may be the meaning of patter in English too, beside other meanings
('patter' a). Into Estonian, the word has been borrowed from low German, where it may have meant to
'chat' already, as does Letzebuergesch poteren. However, etymologically the meaning has been - like that
of middle English patren - 'to recite paternosters' (Weber 1999), maybe mechanically ('patter' b). For the
profound meaning of the prayers did not reach the hearers, it sounded for them like something purposeless.
Whether the meaning reached the patterers, is not known. Yet, it had a purpose for them, even if habitual:
the habitude in fact could have been the reason.
That a jot or a tittle of sound does make a difference is also seen from the following digression. In the
native language of South-East Estonia, negation of a verb is expressed by a single *i* furnished with a glottal
stop. As well known, a negation turns the phrase upside down. It has been noticed that this peculiarity is
very difficult for other Estonians. In official Estonian negation is built in another manner. Kalle Eller has
experienced that though the vocabulary may be memorised by foreigners, and even language spoken after
decades of training, the negation is almost never acquired:
'Suuros erinevuses tulo tunnista tegusyna eitus ... Ei tule om lite voimalusona piaaigu sama vSro
keelengi, a tuu voi ollaq ka pooret: tulo-oiq, tulo-iq... Lounaeestlaisi sekka trehvanu poh'aeestlane
opp kiil arq suuromba osa synavarast ja kato-kolmokiimne aastaga perast kyn5las voro vai seto kiilt
peris ladusalo, a piaaigu kunagi saa-aiq toimo eitusega.' (Eller.)
The contextual or conditioned importance of a jot is particularly true if religious norms are at stake. On
some occasions the norms concern theology proper, as in the case of homoousios or if anthropomorphisms
used for God are treated, like God's eye. It may be substantial to know, how many eyes may be ascribed to
God (Farrukh; idem, van Ess).
The practical impact of the truth concerning, for instance, the eyes, and especially its effect for everyday
life may seem to be of low importance. Thus it seems to be especially in the agnostic, liberal and indifferent
community of today. However, an approach of denying the context of a troublesome jot in order to gain
peace has been made already in the Sirmian Manifesto (357) where the assembled prelates:
'.. recommended the disuse of the terms ousia (essence or substance), homoousion (identical in
essence, or substance), and homoiousion (similar in essence, or substance), "by which the minds of
many are perturbed"; and they held that there "ought to be no mention of any of them at all, nor any
exposition of them in the Church, and for this reason and for this consideration that there is nothing
written about them in divine Scripture and that they are above men's knowledge and above men's
understanding".' (Clifford 1907.)
The proposal has not been accepted. Hushing up the controversy was not an option; the *i* had to be
discussed, and fought for.
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There is something irresistible and enthralling in the 'i\ An individual or a group may be identified by it,
and a society or whole civilisation built on it. In that way the small 'i', furnished with a meaning, becomes
a super-i, which 'monitors and controls the ['i'] like a judge or a censor' (Colman 2003, p. 720). The manner
of this transformation is analogous to the description of the development of super-ego. Using the. words of
the propagator of the concept, Sigmund Freud, an over-I or super-ego is in fact constructed on the model
of predecessors' super-ego, not on themselves; 'the contents which fill it are the same and it becomes the
vehicle of tradition and of all the time-resisting judgements of value which have propagated themselves
in this manner from generation to generation' (ibid.). Identity and ideals, but also norms and taboos are
preserved in the transformed 'i' and passed on. Their presumed antiquity makes them particularly precious.
However, the 'tradition' is usually not older than some generations; sometimes it is longer but not as long
as believed. For instance, the number of sacraments in the Church has not to be fixed to seven (cf. Berman
1983, p. 71). The seven is an 'i'.
Such a settlement of the number of sacraments, or the times and orders of prayer or fasting is ultimately
comparable to the settlement of the order of letters in the Phoenician alphabet (and every other alphabet
deriving there from), for which no reasonable explanation is known. Comparing it to the Indian syllabary
that is scientifically grounded, the Phoenician alphabet is merely a cultural caprice, an artefact.
During an individual development, there may emerge several psychosocial crises, as proposed by Erik
Erikson (Berger 2005, p. 36). Understandably, long-lasting crises may be met also in the development of a 
group - even if it is centred on an 'i', and though the last may have taken control over it. For instance, the
community may have difficulties trusting the others, or 'feel inferior and unable to do anything well', feel
guilty or just stagnate (ibid., p. 37). The 'i' in control does not always avoid crises; it may cause them, but
also mitigate their influence, I suppose.
Are some of the crises connected to the 'i'? Is there a causal link? Not directly, methinks: the cause is how
the *i' has been interpreted or perceived, and what kind of a super-'i' has been constructed. A homoousion 
may be interpreted with contradictory meanings. Which of the meanings is chosen, depends on what is
left unquestioned, what is taken as granted. Those unquestioned questions form the identity of a religious
world-view with its peculiarities. They identify the group as different from the rest. They are fundamental.
2. Normative 'I' in behavioural religious norms
Much more evident is the practical impact of a normative 'i' in the occasion of behavioural religious norms,
let them be of technical, legal or moral character. Based on the analogy of a super-ego, it may, for instance,
develop a super-'i' lacuna, tolerating 'obviously immoral actions that are not forbidden' by its super-'i'
(Colman 2003, p. 720).
Starting from the norms of moral character, the rigour of morality may be either balanced as regards
the requirements ascribed to others and requirements admitted by the person himself or herself, or quite
unbalanced. Almost in every religious tradition the double moral standards and hypocrisy have been
condemned. Jesus has asked: 'And why beholdest thou the mote that is in thy brother's eye, but considerest
not the beam that is in thine own eye?' (Matthew 7:3). Qur'an also condemns hypocrisy repeatedly, as do
other religious sources. However, there exist some kind of double standards in all of them. Due to the
inseparable bond between faith norms and norms of religious moral it is quite presumable that e.g., any
noticeable activity of Protestants and Roman Catholics is considered to be proselytising in Orthodox Russia,
and vice versa, such activity performed by the Orthodox, is just part of the local tradition.
Also, rather peculiar is the phenomenon of idolising a jot among norms of technical character. Whether
to celebrate a Mass facing the people or not, whether to use two or three fingers for the sign of cross,
whether to allow combining of prayers, or to sing in a church accompanied by an instrument or not. Many
religious groups and denominations, in fact, identify themselves not by a fundamental 'i', but by a digit 
added or subtracted.
In the following part of the article, the third type of behavioural norms are addressed, namely the norms
of religious law. It is true that only seldom a difference can be made between the legal and non-legal norms.
However, only some of the norms have a legal character eo ipso, though other types of norms may be
legalised by positive, observable legal practice. With every legal norm added, the bulk of non-legal norms
diminishes.
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In order to determine what (and better: how) is law, the following fragment of the late Harold J. Berman
is almost ineluctable to shed light on the issue:
'The conventional concept of law as a body of rules derived from statutes and court decisions -
reflecting a theory of the ultimate source of law in the will of the lawmaker ("the state") - is wholly
inadequate to support a study of a transnational legal culture. To speak of the Western legal tradition
is to postulate a concept of law, not as a body of rules, but as a process, an enterprise, in which rules
have meaning only in the context of institutions and procedures, values, and ways of thought. From
this broader perspective the sources of law include not only the will of the lawmaker but also the
reason and conscience of the community and its customs and usages.' (Berman 1983, p. 11.)
Being nothing new, this methodological directive applicable par excellence for the study of religious
systems of law, may be effectively combined by the views of the early 20th century representatives of the
so-called legal realism like Eugen Ehrlich or Leon Petrazycki. The first has found that an investigator of law
should first be concerned with 'concrete usages, relations of domination, legal relations, contracts, articles
of association, dispositions by last will and testament. .. [0]nly the concrete usages [etc. ] yield the rules
according to which men regulate their conduct' (Freeman 2005, p. 720, quoting Ehrlich's Principles of the 
Sociology of Law). The latter, in turn, explained the psychological mechanism how (living or) observable
law is created, namely by blanket impulsions of duty 'to which another person's right corresponds, for
example, promisor's duty as matched with promisee's right' (Gorecki 1975, p. 6). Both of the approaches
have been designed mainly for secular law; their theoretical universality is demonstrable from their
fittingness to religious law.
As such, the applicability of law is not limited just to inter-human relations. Thus the rights or duties
may belong to animals, gods or ghosts, in addition to humans. The theory of redemption by St. Anselm
of Canterbury is an instance of laws directing the acts of God. Furthermore, the theory of redemption of
Martin Luther follows the same paradigm, however preferring God's power of amnesty instead of more
legalistic approach - as does Qur'an: 'If We pardon some of you, We will punish others amongst you, for
that they are in sin' (9:66).
The issues of law, lawful consequence (reward), justification, pardon and free will have been the leading
topics in all Abrahamic religious revolutions, including the birth of Protestantism. In Judaism the principal
part of revelation is called the Law (Towrah), and in both Judaism and Islam the 'clergy' is composed, in fact,
of lawyers, advocates of God to whom most religious rights are due. There has even been a classifier of'law
religions' - even if the religions have a too complex structure to be reduced to mere law.
Two other issues need addressing here. There may be a discrepancy between the Ehrlichian concept of
living law and the law (or the Law) posited by revelation. However, as in secular legal systems the law-giver
may posit statutes and codes containing rules which never will be accepted and lived according to, so also
revealed positive law may contain rules which are not followed, i.e. religious rules which never become
religious law. Thus, the legal reading of the respective revealed (or other normative) text should never be
taken as a true description of religious law, even if it may be an important source for the investigator as
regards the will of God, rules of faith or else. A given rule that is never applied in reality, is in fact evidence
of a contrary or contradictory rule in living law. Similarly, if a revealed rule is applied in a manner totally
diverted from the revealed form, it should not be seen dogmatically as a heresy or breaking the rule but
rather as true content of the rule as applied by practitioners.
As an example could be named the harsh punishments provided in the Jewish Law that have not been
carried out for at least two thousand years due to the non-existence of Jewish state (Cohen 1995, p. 190). It
is in this respect possible that the motto of the article could be interpreted: if due to Roman occupation the
accomplishment of Jewish penal law was not possible in respect of execution of sanctions, the law should
be fulfilled by following more sincerely the purpose of the precepts (cf. 'Expounding of the Law').
Secondly, due to the great part of vertical obligations in religious law, i.e. obligations to which only
the right of God corresponds, there emerges the question of God's representation on Earth: is anybody
authorised to protect the legal interest of God? Is it the community at large, or only established religious or
civil authority who may lead the proceedings? Or is the enforcement reserved to God? Practically, from the
point of view of an investigator of the living law these questions remain merely theoretical. However, from
the point of view of defence they may be extremely important.
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Here, also the distinction of forum externum and forum internum may be addressed. The latter does not
need to be confined to the rules of mere morality if the obligated party is seen to owe the obligation to God
in a way which is strictly required. In Islamic Law, the difference between fard and mandub obligations,
and respectively haram and makruh prohibitions could be relevant. This parallel is however possible only
so far as respectively the mandub actions are 'rewarded, but the omission is not punished', and a makruh 
action are 'disliked and disapproved by the Shari'ah but it is not under any penalty' (Doi 1997, pp. 50-51). It
may be interpreted in the way that, e.g. in the latter case God has the right to be disgusted with an illegal act
but will not punish for it. In this way the forum internum is also fulfilled by legal though not always legally
sanctioned content, and the space for religious morality is left minute.
The rules of religious law are not confined to the religious sphere. In fact, the veiy modern and Occidental
distinction of religious and secular spheres may be inappropriate while investigating legal cultures of other
traditions. Harold Berman criticises A. S. Diamond, who:
'reduces his own argument to absurdity when he contends that much of the Hebrew law of the
Old Testament is also "secular law," wholly distinct from religion. The Hebrews never recognized
such a distinction and would have denounced it; for them eveiy word of the Bible was sacred.'
(Berman 1983, p. 80.)
The same holds true for eventually every community prior to the rise of Modernism in respective part of
the World. The interconnectedness of law and religion is still reflected by the relics of court ritual and many
other ceremonies in law which lack any reasonable legal explanation. The connection is reflected also by
legal documents which cite religious texts as their sources. The Civil Law of Baltic Governments (1845),
valid in Estonia until 1944, has been one of such enactments.
3. Religious law in conflict and dialogue
Religious law is by far not the only legal reality today. On the other hand its existence should not be denied,
for in the consciousness of a religious person, the impulses of religious obligations compete with other
obliging impulses, and there are no impulses having a priori superiority or prevalence. Just to state that a 
person is primarily a citizen of a state, is not convincing.
In general, interpretations given to religious norms may justify actions and practices which contravene,
for example, international human rights standards. In some of the cases the conflict is ostensible because
the religious argument has been used insincerely or abusively. Other considerations, having political,
nationalist, or economic nature have been pursued under the religious guise.
An illustration may be provided concerning Nigeria:
'It is not unusual for two different ethnic groups with a long history of conflict to have adopted
different religions with the effect of exacerbating existing tensions. ... [A] mainly Christian Tarok
militia from a nearby town in Plateau State massacred more than 500 mainly Muslim Hausa/Fulani
residents in Yelwa village. The massacre occurred after a February incident in Yelwa in which more
than 40 Christian Taroks were burned to death in a church. A week later in Kano State, Muslims
staged a peaceful rally protesting the violence against Muslims in Plateau State. The rally took
on a religious dimension when unemployed youth began vandalizing businesses belonging to
Christians and erupted into mob violence in which more than 300 Muslims and Christians were
killed.' (TSfigeria')
Many problems that have emerged during the last years may be reduced to an identity crisis of at least one
party of the conflict - yeah, even the international community may suffer from such crisis. Traditionally
the conflict is more likely to be between 'us' and 'them', these who have the 'i', and those who lack or do not
respect it enough.
Sometimes a single person is the target of an attack justified by religious law. The most well known case
of Salman Rushdie is by far not the only one. Amnesty International (AI) has announced that
'Dr Younis Shaikh, a medical school lecturer, was sentenced to death on 18 August by a criminal
court in Islamabad for blasphemy. He had allegedly remarked during a lecture that the Prophet
Mohammed was not a Muslim until the age of 40 when Islam was revealed to him. His comments
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were taken up by an Islamist organization.., which brought a complaint to the police.' ('Death
Penalty News')
Sometimes the justice has been taken in the hands of the community. Thus, AI reported in 2003 that
Mushtaq Zafar was shot dead by two unidentified gunmen on his way home from the court in a blasphemy
case brought against him by his neighbours. A dispute between Mushtaq Zafar and his neighbours resulted
in his house being set alight and shots being fired at him, killing a friend of his. The report continues: 'The
neighbours were arrested for the murder ... [According to Mushtaq Zafar's son, the neighbours' family put
pressure on his father to withdraw the murder case and the accusation of blasphemy against him was part
of an attempt to intimidate him. Friends and relatives of the neighbours allegedly wrote to religious leaders,
demanding Mushtaq Zafar's death.'
The mass attacks may be one- or both-sided, as in the case of India, where, for instance, 'more than two
thousand people had been killed in early 2002 in the wave of violence targeting the Muslim community.
These killings followed an attack on a train in Godhra in February 2002 in which fifty-nine Hindus were
killed by a mob' ('India'). Ten years before that a conflict burst out in India, in connection to the demolishing
of Ayodhya mosque which according to a myth had been built on the birth-place of god Rama.
At least in the first case, passive involvement of the state makes the religious nature of the conflict
questionable. Namely,
'[rjeports implicated police officers and members of Hindu nationalist groups, including
the Vishwa Hindu Parishad (VHP) and the ruling BJP in the violence against Muslims. There
was increasing concern about the failure of the state government of Gujarat to ensure that those
responsible for widespread communal violence in early 2002 were brought to justice. In many
cases, attempts to hold the perpetrators accountable were hampered by the highly defective manner
in which police recorded complaints. Victims complained that police failed to register complaints,
or recorded details in such a way as to lead to lesser charges, omitted the names of prominent people
who were pivotal in the attacks, and did not take appropriate action to arrest suspects, particularly
where they were supporters of the BJP.' ('India')
As shown by the developments of the Darfur conflict in Sudan, such state-supported or even state-organised
conflicts need not necessarily religious difference, and ethno-cultural difference (of Arabs and Africans) is
sufficient to actuate hatred and genocide (Vid. Glazov 2004).
Even using traditional methods immanent to the religion, religious law may in majority of cases be
interpreted in a way that conforms to other legal considerations. In Jewish Law, for instance, the principle
dPna' de-malUluwta' dPna' recognises political law of even a heathen state supreme, as far as denial of
most holy principles of Judaism is not required (Cohen 1995, p. 90). In such way, avoiding the conflict is
possible.
If the immanent and traditional methods are exhausted, a conflict may be avoided or mitigated only by a 
dialogue between representatives of the normative systems. Entering into the dialogue presumes that each
party is ready to acknowledge the faults of his own legal system; if the factual development of the system is
observed, its imperfectness is evident and a possibility of further developments and reinterpretations could
be recognised. Thus the process should be started by an internal purification and setting things in the right
order; paraphrasing the Gospel, 'if thy right 'i' offend thee, pluck it out, and cast it from thee: for it is
profitable for thee that one of thy members should perish, and not that thy whole body should be cast into
hell' (Matthew 5:29). It is preferable that the dialogue is not centred on the question of truth but rather on
self criticism (Kiing 1992, p. 109).
For a basis of such criticism, the fundamentals of the religion should be rediscovered, asking what in
fact is the message and purpose thereof: is the 'i' really so important (cf . Abou el Fadl 2003, p. 249)? An
illustration may be given from Saudi Arabia where during a fire religious police did not let out improperly
clothed girls who then perished in the fire ('Saudi Arabia').
Also, a dialogue presumes mutual independence, autonomy and recognition by the parties concerned.
An exercise of a position of power by a party or a tertium gaudens is absolutely prohibited. Every irrelevant
and immaterial motive or consideration should be left aside, especially if it could inhibit the process of
dialogue (Kalmet 2006, p. 200 etpassim-, cf. Raudsepp 2007, p. 2220).
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The purpose of the dialogue should not be set too high: when hating each other, it is not easy to start
loving instantly. Achieving a kind of modus vivendi could be set as a primary purpose. It may be done by
not concentrating on the different (though it may not be denied) but rather unifying needs, tasks and hopes
of humanity. An excellent model description of such a dialogue is Graham Greene's Monsignor Quixote. 
Positions centred on *i* are as dangerous as positions concentrated in I (Raudsepp 2007, p. 2232).
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